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Abstract. Drawing on the previous work [1] on interpolation failure, we
show that Beth’s definability theorem does not hold for intuitionistic pred-
icate logic of constant domains without identity.
It is known that intuitionistic predicate logic of constant domains without identity
does not have Craig interpolation property. Given that this property is normally used
to derive, among other things, Beth’s definability theorem, the failure of interpolation
suggests a hypothesis that for the mentioned logic Beth’s definability property fails,
too. In the paper expounding the non-interpolation result its authors mention this
hypothesis: “It is not known at this moment whether CD has the Beth property,
although this does not look plausible” [1, p. 3].
In the present paper we show that this hypothesis is in fact true. The counterexam-
ple we give for Beth’s definability property of CD is in close and obvious connection
with the counterexample for interpolation given in [1], and we use similar methods to
prove that it is in fact a counterexample. However, the models used in the counterex-
ample are somewhat different and more complicated than the ones used to disprove
interpolation. This necessitates introduction of some new technical notions that were
not required for the interpolation failure proof and discussion of some of their proper-
ties.
Definition 1. A theory T in language L implicitly defines P ∈ L iff for any model M
of T there is no model N of T that would differ from M only in the extension of P . A
theory T in language L explicitly defines P ∈ L iff there is a formula Θ(~x) ∈ Lr {P},
such that T |= ∀~x(Θ(~x) ↔ P (~x)). A logic has Beth’s definability property iff for any
theory T in any language L of this logic and any P ∈ L, if T defines P implicitly, then
T defines P explicitly.
We assume the results proved and the notions defined in [1] and notational conven-
tions used there.
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Consider function
γ(n) =
{
3n+ 1, if n ∈ 3N ∪ (3N+ 2);
n otherwise.
and relation R(x, y) ⇔ (x = γ(y) ∨ y = γ(x)). If X ⊆ N then we call it closed iff
it is closed with respect to R, and we take the closure of X , Cl(X) to be the least Y
such that X ⊆ Y ⊆ N and Y is closed. For X ⊆ N we denote Cl(X)rX by Cl−(X).
It is easy to see that our closures have a very special structure: every closed set is
representable as a sum of singletons and pairs which are closures of its points. So the
following notion of the companion of a natural n (which we denote by n˜) turns out to
be useful:
x˜ =
{
y, if x 6= y ∈ Cl({x});
x otherwise.
We denote the set of natural numbers that are their own companions by N0. Thus
N0 = {n | γ(n) = n}. The following lemma states some obvious properties of the
notions defined above that we will need in what follows:
Lemma 1. Let n ∈ N, X ⊆ N. Then the following statements are true:
N0 = Nr Cl(3N ∪ (3N+ 2)); (1)
N0 is infinite; (2)
Cl(X) is finite ⇔ Cl−(X) is finite ⇔ X is finite; (3)
n = ˜˜n; (4)
n ∈ 3N ∪ 3N+ 2⇔ n˜ ∈ Cl−(3N ∪ 3N+ 2); (5)
n˜ ∈ 3N ∪ 3N+ 2⇔ n ∈ Cl−(3N ∪ 3N+ 2); (6)
Cl−(X) ⊆ 3N+ 1 (7)
X = Cl(X)⇔ NrX = Cl(N rX) (8)
Proof. Most of the statements are in fact self-evident given the above definitions. As
an example we sketch proofs of the following ones:
(2) Let n0 = 1, ni+1 = 3ni + 1. An easy induction shows that ni 6= nj for i 6= j
and that all ni are in N0.
(8) Let X be a closed subset of N and let n /∈ X . If n˜ ∈ X , then, by closure of X
and (4), n = ˜˜n ∈ X which contradicts the choice of n. Therefore, NrX is closed.
We consider the following quasi-partitions:
v = (v1,v2,v3) = (N r Cl(3N+ 2), Cl
−(3N+ 2), (3N+ 2))
u = (u1,u2,u3) = (v1, ∅,v2 ∪ v3)
It is clear that these are in fact quasi-partitions.
Moreover, consider set
U = {(A,B,C) | v E (A,B,C), A is closed, B ⊆ v2}
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It follows from (8) that v1 is closed. Therefore, U is non-empty, for example, v ∈ U .
The following lemma states some obvious properties of the defined quasi-partitions
that we will need in what follows:
Lemma 2. Let w = (w1, w2, w3) ∈ W2.Then the following statements are true:
u E v; (9)
w2 ⊆ v2; (10)
Cl(3N) ∪ N0 ⊆ v1 = u1 ⊆ w1 (11)
w ∈ U ⇒ w3 is an infinite subset of 3N+ 2; (12)
w ∈ U ⇒ (3N+ 1) ⊆ w1 ∪ w2; (13)
w ∈ U ⇒ w2 = Cl
−(w3); (14)
w ∈ U ⇒ w2 ∩ v2 6= ∅. (15)
Proof. Again, most of the statements are in fact self-evident given the above definitions.
As an example we sketch proofs of the following ones:
(11) We have 3N ⊆ v1, since Cl(3N+2) = (3N+2)∪Cl−(3N+2) ⊆ (3N+2)∪(3N+1)
by (7). Therefore, Cl(3N) ⊆ Cl(v1) = v1. We also have N0 ⊆ v1 by (1).
(13) Since w ∈ U , by v E w we have w3 ⊆ v3, therefore v1 ∪ v2 ⊆ w1 ∪ w2. And
we clearly have (3N+ 1) ⊆ Nr (3N+ 2) = v1 ∪ v2.
(14) If x ∈ w3, then by (12) x ∈ 3N + 2, therefore x˜ ∈ 3N + 1 whence by (13)
x˜ ∈ w1 ∪ w2, so x˜ /∈ w3. If x˜ ∈ w1 then by closure of w1 we must have x ∈ w1, a
contradiction. Therefore, x˜ ∈ w2. In the other direction, if x ∈ w2 ⊆ v2 (by (10)),
then x ∈ Cl−(3N+ 2), therefore, x˜ ∈ (3N + 2). So, x˜ /∈ w2, but then x˜ ∈ w1 ∪ w3. If
x˜ ∈ w1, then by closure x ∈ w1, a contradiction. Therefore, x˜ ∈ w3.
(15) By (12), w3 is non-empty and w3 ⊆ 3N+2. So, choose k such that n = 3k+2 ∈ w3
and consider n˜ ∈ 3N+ 1. By (14), n˜ ∈ Cl−(w3) = w2, and given (10), n˜ ∈ B ∩ v2.
M1 and M2 are of the form M = 〈W,≤,w, D, φ〉 they are defined as follows.
1. The base points for M1 and M2 are v and u respectively;
2. The sets of states for the models are as follows.
(a) W1 = U ;
(b) W2 = U ∪ {u};
3. The ordering on both M1 and M2 is E;
4. D1 = D2 = N;
5. For i = 1, 2, the values φi assigned to the predicate symbols P , Q, R and the
propositional letter s are defined by
φi(P ) = {〈v, a〉|a ∈ v1 ∪ v2},
φi(Q) = {〈v, a〉|a ∈ v1},
φi(R) = {〈v, a〉|γ(a) ∈ v1},
φi(s) = U.
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For i = 1, 2 we denote extension of a predicate letter Π ∈ {P,Q,R} at w ∈ Wi,
that is to say, the right projection of the set φi(Π) ∩ ({w} × N), by φwi (Π).
Now, consider theory T :
∀x(s→ ∃y(P (y) ∧ (Q(y)→ R(x)))) (16)
¬∀xR(x) (17)
∀x(P (x)→ (Q(x) ∨ s)) (18)
Lemma 3. Both M1 and M2 satisfy T .
Proof. It is sufficient to consider M2 only, since M1 is an ‘accessibility-closed’ sub-
model of M2.
M2 clearly satisfies (18) since s is universally true in every world of this model
except for u. But for this world we also have φu2 (P ) ⊆ φ
u
2 (Q), so (18) holds at M2.
Choose any w ∈ W2. If w /∈ U , then w = u and w1 ∩ v2 = ∅. Therefore, it follows
from (15) that for any w ∈W2 we can choose an n such that 3n+1 ∈ v2rw1. For this
n we will have 3n+ 1 /∈ φw2 (Q), and, therefore n /∈ φ
w
2 (R). Hence (17) holds as well.
Finally, consider (16). If for w ∈ W2 we have w 2 s then w ∈ U , therefore,
reasoning exactly as in [1](i.e. choosing γ(a) for every a ∈ N) one can show that the
consequent of (16) is true at w.
Lemma 4. T implicitly defines s.
Proof. Let M = 〈W,≤,w, D, φ〉 and let w ∈ W . If w M s then choose a /∈ φw(R)
(such an a exists sinceM |= (17)) and consider b such that w M P (b)∧(Q(b)→ R(a)).
For this b we will have b ∈ φwM(P )r φ
w
M(Q).
In the other direction, let for some b it is true that b ∈ φwM(P )r φ
w
M(Q). Then, by
M |= (18), we will have w M s.
Definition 2. Relative to the models M1 and M2, the relation Z is defined as follows:
1. Z ⊆
⋃
k≥0[(W1 ×D
k
1 )× (W2 ×D
k
2 )] ∪ [(W2 ×D
k
2 )× (W1 ×D
k
1 )];
2. 〈(A,B,C), ~d〉 Z 〈(D,E, F ), ~e〉, where ~d ∈ Dki , ~e ∈ D
k
j , {i, j} = {1, 2}, if and only
if the following conditions hold:
(a) Relation [~d 7→ ~e] is a bijection;
(b) If 1 ≤ l ≤ k, then dl ∈ (3N ∪ 3N+ 2)⇔ el ∈ (3N ∪ 3N+ 2);
(c) If 1 ≤ l ≤ k, then dl ∈ N0 ⇔ el ∈ N0;
(d) If 1 ≤ l,m ≤ k then dl = d˜m ⇔ el = e˜m;
(e) If 1 ≤ l ≤ k and dl ∈ A then el ∈ D;
(f) If 1 ≤ l ≤ k and dl ∈ B, then el ∈ D ∪E.
It is easy to see that in the case when both 〈(A,B,C), ~d〉 Z 〈(D,E, F ), ~e〉 and
〈(D,E, F ), ~e〉Z 〈(A,B,C), ~d〉 hold, conditions 2(e),(f) of this definition are equivalent,
modulo other restrictions, to the following ones:
dl ∈ A iff el ∈ D;
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dl ∈ B iff el ∈ E,
for every 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
Further, it follows from conditions 2(b),(c) and (1) that
dl ∈ Cl(3N ∪ 3N+ 2) iff el ∈ Cl(3N ∪ 3N+ 2);
dl ∈ Cl
−(3N ∪ 3N+ 2) iff el ∈ Cl
−(3N ∪ 3N+ 2),
for every 1 ≤ l ≤ k.
Lemma 5. The relation Z in Definition 2 is a CD-asimulation between the L(P,Q,R)-
reducts of G-models M1 and M2.
Proof. The first condition in definition of asimulation is true by definition. For the
second condition, assume that v, ~dZw,~e and that v i P [~d], where P (xl) is atomic,
~d ∈ Dki , and 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Thus we have v i P [d], where d = dl, so that d ∈ v1 ∪ v2;
it follows that e = el ∈ w1 ∪ w2, by Definition 2, showing that v j P [~e]. The proof
for atomic formulas Q(xl) is similar. Finally, assume that v i R[~d], where R(xl) is
atomic, ~d ∈ Dki , and 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Thus we have v i R[d], where d = dl, so that
γ(d) ∈ v1; since v1 is closed, we have d ∈ v1 but then by Definition 2 it follows that
e = el ∈ w1, and, given that w1 is closed as well, we get γ(e) ∈ w1 and w j R[e] for
the corresponding j ∈ {1, 2}.
For the third condition, assume that t, ~dZu,~e, where t = (A,B,C), u = (D,E, F ),
and u ≤j v, v = (G,H, I). By definition, u E v. Two cases arise here: B is infinite, or
B = ∅.
In the first case, we clearly have (A,B,C) ∈ U . We define w = (J,K,L) as follows:
J = Cl((Ar ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G));
K = ((B r ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(H))r J ;
L = ((C r ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(I))r J.
Claim 1 : (J,K,L) ∈ U .
Sets (Ar ~d)∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G), (Br ~d)∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(H) and (Cr ~d)∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(I) are
clearly pairwise disjoint and their union is N. But J , K, L differ from these sets only
in that all the elements of the set Cl−((Ar ~d)∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G)) were removed from the
last two components of (J,K,L) and moved to the first one. Therefore J , K, L are
pairwise disjoint, too, and we have J ∪K ∪ L = N. Moreover, set 3Nr ~d is obviously
infinite, and by (11) we have
(3Nr ~d) ⊆ (v1 r ~d) ⊆ (Ar ~d) ⊆ J.
Therefore, J is infinite and it is closed by definition.
Subclaim 1.1. L and K are infinite.
Since (A,B,C) ∈ U , C is, by (12), an infinite subset of (3N + 2). But then, since
~d is finite, (C r ~d) is infinite, too. So, if (C r ~d) r J is finite, then (C r ~d) ∩ J must
be infinite. Given that
(C r ~d) ∩ Cl(Ar ~d) ⊆ C ∩ Cl(A) = C ∩ A = ∅,
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we obtain that (C r ~d) ∩ Cl([~d 7→ ~e]−1(G)) must be infinite. But Cl([~d 7→ ~e]−1(G)) is
a closure of a finite set and therefore by (3) is itself finite, a contradiction. Therefore,
(C r ~d)r J ⊆ L is infinite.
Moreover, if n ∈ C r ~d then by (14) n˜ ∈ B. Since for all m,n ∈ N we have
m 6= n⇒ m˜ 6= n˜, the set {n˜ | n ∈ C r ~d}r ~d is an infinite subset of K.
Subclaim 1.2. K ⊆ v2.
By (10) we have H ∩ ~e ⊆ H ⊆ v2 and also B r ~d ⊆ B ⊆ v2. If for some 1 ≤ l ≤ k
el ∈ H and dl /∈ v2, then dl /∈ B, therefore, dl ∈ A ∪ C. If dl ∈ A, then el ∈ D ⊆ G
which contradicts the assumption that el ∈ H . If dl ∈ C, then by (12) dl ∈ 3N + 2,
therefore, by condition 2(b) of Definition 2, el ∈ 3N∪ (3N+ 2) and so el /∈ v2, again a
contradiction. So we have [~d 7→ ~e]−1(H)) ⊆ v2 and, in sum, K ⊆ v2.
This completes the proof of our Claim 1.
Claim 2 : (A,B,C) E (J,K,L).
If a ∈ A, and a is in ~d, say a = dl, then el ∈ D, so el ∈ G, from which it follows
that dl = a ∈ J . So A ⊆ J . Since I ⊆ F , we have [~d 7→ ~e]−1(I) ⊆ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(F ) ⊆ C,
showing that L ⊆ C.
Claim 3 : For 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
dl ∈ J iff el ∈ G;
dl ∈ K iff el ∈ H.
For the first part, if dl ∈ J then either dl ∈ Cl(A r ~d) or dl ∈ Cl([~d 7→ ~e]−1(G)).
In the former case dl ∈ Cl(A) = A, therefore el ∈ D ⊆ G. In the latter case either
dl ∈ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G) and then clearly el ∈ G or there exists 1 ≤ m ≤ k such that dl = d˜m
and dm ∈ [~d 7→ ~e]
−1(G). But then we also have em ∈ G and, by condition 2(e) of
Definition 2, el = e˜m, and, since G is closed, we get el ∈ G.
In the other direction, if el ∈ G, then dl ∈ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G) whence dl ∈ J .
For the second part, if dl ∈ K, then dl ∈ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(H) whence el ∈ H .
In the other direction, if el ∈ H , then clearly dl ∈ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(H). If, moreover,
dl ∈ J , then either dl ∈ Cl(A r ~d) or dl ∈ Cl([~d 7→ ~e]−1(G)). In the former case
dl ∈ Cl(A) = A, therefore, we must have el ∈ G which contradicts the choice of el. In
the latter case, since we clearly have that dl /∈ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G), there must be 1 ≤ m ≤ k
such that dl = d˜m and dm ∈ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G). But then we also have em ∈ G and, by
condition 2(e) of Definition 2, el = e˜m, and, since G is closed, we get el ∈ G, which
again contradicts the choice of el. Therefore, dl ∈ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(H)r J ⊆ K.
In the second case we clearly have (A,B,C) = u and we define w = (J,K,L) as
follows:
J = Cl((Ar ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(G));
K = ((Cl−(3N+ 2)r ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(H)) r J ;
L = ((3N+ 2)r ~d) ∪ [~d 7→ ~e]−1(I)) r J.
We need now to reinstate our previous claims for these new definitions.
Claim 1 : (J,K,L) ∈ U .
Since A = u1 = v1, we clearly have J ∪K∪L = N. Moreover, J ∩K = J ∩L = ∅ by
definition, and since it is clear that (Cl−(3N+2)r~d)∪[~d 7→ ~e]−1(H) and ((3N+2)r~d)∪[~d 7→ ~e]−1(I)
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are disjoint, we also get that K and L are disjoint. Further, J is closed by definition
and contains Ar ~d as an infinite subset.
Subclaim 1.1. L is an infinite subset of 3N+ 2, K is infinite.
Since ~d is finite, ((3N + 2) r ~d) is infinite, too. So, if ((3N + 2) r ~d) r J is finite,
then ((3N+ 2)r ~d) ∩ J must be infinite. Given that
((3N+ 2)r ~d) ∩ Cl(Ar ~d) ⊆ (3N+ 2) ∩ Cl(A) ⊆ C ∩ A = ∅,
we obtain that ((3N+2)r ~d)∩Cl([~d 7→ ~e]−1(G)) must be infinite. But Cl([~d 7→ ~e]−1(G))
is a closure of a finite set and therefore, by (3) is itself finite, a contradiction. Therefore,
((3N+ 2)r ~d)r J ⊆ L is infinite.
Moreover, it is easy to see that if n ∈ (3N+2)r ~d then n˜ ∈ Cl−(3N+2)r ~d. Since for
allm,n ∈ N we havem 6= n⇒ m˜ 6= n˜, the set Cl−(3N+2)r ~d is an infinite subset ofK.
It remains to verify [~d 7→ ~e]−1(I) ⊆ (3N+ 2), so that we can be sure that L ⊆ 3N+ 2.
Since (A,B,C) = u, we know that (G,H, I) ∈ U and therefore I ⊆ (3N + 2). So,
by condition 2(b) of Definition 2, if for 1 ≤ l ≤ k we have dl ∈ [~d 7→ ~e]
−1(I), then
el ∈ I ⊆ (3N + 2) and dl ∈ 3N ∪ (3N + 2). But if dl ∈ 3N, then, by (11), dl ∈ A,
therefore el ∈ G, a contradiction. So we must have dl ∈ (3N+ 2)
Subclaim 1.2. K ⊆ v2.
By (10) we have H ∩ ~e ⊆ H ⊆ v2 and also Cl
−(3N + 2) r ~d ⊆ v2. If, for some
1 ≤ l ≤ k, el ∈ H and dl /∈ v2, then dl ∈ A ∪ (3N + 2). If dl ∈ A, then el ∈ D ⊆ G
which contradicts the assumption that el ∈ H . If dl ∈ 3N+ 2, then, by condition 2(b)
of Definition 2, el ∈ 3N∪ (3N+ 2) and so el /∈ v2, which is a contradiction by (10). So
we have [~d 7→ ~e]−1(H) ⊆ v2 and, in sum, K ⊆ v2.
This completes the proof of our Claim 1.
Claim 2 : (A,B,C) E (J,K,L).
A ⊆ J can be verified as in Case 1 and L ⊆ C follows from Claim 1.1 and the fact
that (A,B,C) = u.
Claim 3 : For 1 ≤ l ≤ k,
dl ∈ J iff el ∈ G;
dl ∈ K iff el ∈ H.
This Claim, again, can be verified as in Case 1. So, we have completed the proof
for the third condition.
For the fourth condition in definition of asimulation, assume that t ∈Wi, (t, ~dZu,~e),
where t = (G,H, I), u = (J,K,L), and f ∈ Di. Three cases are possible:
Case 1. f /∈ Cl(~d). Then three subcases are possible:
Subcase 1.1 f ∈ N0. Then choose any g ∈ N0 r Cl(~e). This is possible since this
set is infinite. By (11) we have N0 ⊆ v1 ⊆ u1 and so we are done.
Subcase 1.2 f ∈ 3N ∪ 3N + 2. Then choose any g ∈ 3N r Cl(~e). This is possible
since this set is infinite. By (11) we have 3N ⊆ v1 ⊆ u1 and so we are done.
Subcase 1.3. f ∈ Cl−(3N∪3N+2). Then choose any g ∈ Cl−(3N). This is possible
since this set is infinite. By (11) we have Cl−(3N) ⊆ v1 ⊆ u1 and so we are done.
Case 2. f ∈ ~d. Then set g := el.
Case 3. f ∈ Cl−(~d). This means that for some 1 ≤ l ≤ k f = d˜l 6= dl. Therefore,
by conditions 2(b)–(d) of Definition 2, f, dl, el, e˜l ∈ Cl(3N ∪ 3N+ 2), and e˜l 6= el. So,
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in particular, by (1), we have f, e˜l /∈ N0. Then set g := e˜l. Let us make sure that
conditions of Definition 2 are satisfied. For example, by (5), (6) we have:
f = d˜l ∈ 3N ∪ 3N+ 2⇔ dl ∈ Cl
−(3N ∪ 3N+ 2)
⇔ el ∈ Cl
−(3N ∪ 3N+ 2)
⇔ g = e˜l ∈ 3N ∪ 3N+ 2.
Further, if f = d˜l ∈ G then, since G is closed, dl ∈ G, but then also el ∈ J and, by
closure of J , g = e˜l ∈ J . Moreover, if f = d˜l ∈ H , then H 6= ∅, so t ∈ U and, by (12),
dl ∈ I ⊆ 3N+2. But then, by condition 2(b) of Definition 2, el ∈ 3N∪ 3N+2 ⊆ J ∪L,
where the latter inclusion holds due to (10)–(12). Therefore, g = e˜l ∈ Cl−(J ∪L) ⊆ K
by (14) and since by closure of J we have Cl−(J) = ∅.
The fifth condition is proved by a similar argument. Namely, assume that t ∈ Wi,
(t, ~dZu,~e), where t = (G,H, I), u = (J,K,L), and g ∈ Dj .Three cases are possible:
Case 1. g /∈ Cl(~e). Then three subcases are possible:
Subcase 1.1 g ∈ N0. Then choose any f ∈ N0 r Cl(~d). This is possible since this
set is infinite. By (11) we have N0 ⊆ v1 ⊆ u1 and so we are done.
Subcase 1.2 g ∈ 3N ∪ 3N+ 2. Then choose any f ∈ (I ∩ (3N+ 2))r Cl(~d). This is
possible since it follows from (3), (12) that this set is infinite.
Subcase 1.3. g ∈ Cl−(3N∪3N+2). Then g ∈ J∪K. Choose any f ∈ Cl−(I∩(3N+2))rCl(~d).
This is possible since this set is infinite. Indeed, I ∩ (3N + 2) is infinite by (12), but
then, by (3), Cl−(I ∩ (3N+ 2)) is infinite and Cl(~d) is finite. By (14) we have f ∈ H
and so we are done.
Case 2. g ∈ ~e. Then set f := dl.
Case 3. g ∈ Cl(~e)r ~e. This means that for some 1 ≤ l ≤ k g = e˜l 6= el. Therefore,
by conditions 2(b)–(d) of Definition 2, dl, d˜l, el, g ∈ Cl(3N ∪ 3N+ 2), and d˜l 6= dl. So
in particular, by (1), d˜l, g /∈ N0. Then set f := d˜l. Let us make sure that conditions of
Definition 2 are satisfied. For example, by (5), (6) we have:
g = e˜l ∈ 3N ∪ 3N+ 2⇔ el ∈ Cl
−(3N ∪ 3N+ 2)
⇔ dl ∈ Cl
−(3N ∪ 3N+ 2)
⇔ f = d˜l ∈ 3N ∪ 3N+ 2.
Further, if f = d˜l ∈ G then, since G is closed, dl ∈ G, but then also el ∈ J and, by
closure of J , g = e˜l ∈ J . Moreover, if f = d˜l ∈ H , then H 6= ∅, so t ∈ U and, by (12),
dl ∈ I ⊆ 3N+2. But then, by condition 2(b) of Definition 2, el ∈ 3N∪ 3N+2 ⊆ J ∪L,
where the latter inclusion holds due to (10)–(12). Therefore, g = e˜l ∈ Cl−(J ∪L) ⊆ K
by (14) and since by closure of J we have Cl−(J) = ∅.
Theorem 1. Intuitionistic predicate logic of constant domains does not have Beth
definability property.
Proof. Consider Theory T . According to Lemma 4, it implicitly defines s. If the logic
in question enjoys Beth definability property, then there is a sentence Θ ∈ L(P,Q,R)
such that T |= s ↔ Θ. But then, by Lemma 3, we must have v 1 Θ. It follows from
Definition 2 that 〈v,Λ〉Z〈u,Λ〉, where Λ is the empty sequence of objects. Therefore,
by Lemma 5, we must have u 2 Θ. But, given that s is not true at u, this gives us a
contradiction with Lemma 3.
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